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A tradition handed down among physicists maintains that classical physics is a perfectly deterministic theory
capable of predicting the future with absolute certainty, independently of any interpretations. It also tells that
it was quantum mechanics that introduced fundamental indeterminacy into physics. We show that there exist
alternative stories to be told in which classical mechanics, too, can be interpreted as a fundamentally indeter-
ministic theory. On the one hand, this leaves room for the many possibilities of an open future, yet, on the
other, it brings into classical physics some of the conceptual issues typical of quantum mechanics, such as the
measurement problem. We discuss here some of the issues of an alternative, indeterministic classical physics
and their relation to the theory of information and the notion of causality.
I. WHEN DID PHYSICS BECOME UNPREDICTABLE?
Like all of the human activities, also science maintains tra-
ditions that are handed down from generation to generation
and help to form the identity of a community. One spe-
cific story that seems to have crystallized among practition-
ers is that classical physics (i.e., Newton’s mechanics and
Maxwell’s electrodynamics) would allow, in principle, to pre-
dict everything with certainty. The standard story continues by
telling that the foundations of such theory are perfectly well
understood and free of any interpretational issues. In partic-
ular, it is widely accepted that classical physics categorically
entails a deterministic worldview.
Indeed, due to the tremendous predictive success of Newto-
nian physics (in particular in celestial mechanics), it became
customary to conceive an in principle limitless predictability
of the physical phenomena that would faithfully reflect the
fact that our Universe is governed by determinism. This view
was advocated and vastly popularized in the early nineteenth
century by Pierre-Simon Laplace, who envisaged the possi-
bility for a hypothetical superior intelligence (went down in
history as Laplace’s demon) to predict the future states of the
universe with infinite precision, given a sufficient knowledge
of the laws of nature and the initial conditions [1]:
Given for one instant an intelligence which could
comprehend all the forces by which nature is ani-
mated and the respective situation of the beings
which compose it –an intelligence sufficiently
vast to submit these data to analysis– it would
embrace in the same formula the movements of
the greatest bodies in the universe and those of
the lightest atom; to it nothing would be uncer-
tain, and the future as the past would be present
to its eyes.
The standard story goes on by stating that this faith in
perfect determinism was abruptly shattered by the advent
of quantum theory, which, with its probabilistic predictions,
made indeterministic doubts burst into physics for the first
time.1 But is it really so? In this essay, we will show that
this is not necessarily the case and that the alleged fundamen-
tal difference between classical and quantum physics based
on their alleged inherently deterministic, respectively indeter-
ministic, character should be rethought.
From the historical point of view, as early as 1895 –thus
before that any quantum effect was discovered and such the-
ory formulated– the father of the kinetic theory of gases, Lud-
wig Boltzmann, already doubted the very possibility of having
perfect determinism at the microscopic scale (see, [2, 3]). It
ought to be noticed that according to the standard understand-
ing of classical statistical mechanics, probabilities are there
introduced to account for a lack of knowledge about the ac-
tual state of affairs (epistemic randomness) and are not sup-
posed to be irreducible.2 This is due to the fact that statistical
physics deals with an enormous amount of components (and
of degrees of freedom), but it is generally accepted that ev-
ery single classical particle has a perfectly predetermined be-
havior (and that in principle this is predictable). Despite this,
Boltzmann maintained: “I will mention the possibility that the
fundamental equations for the motion of individual molecules
will turn out to be only approximate formulas which give aver-
age values.” [5]. Also Franz S. Exner, another eminent Vien-
nese physicists, contemporary of Boltzmann, questioned the
validity of determinism in classical physics even at the macro-
scopic level: “In the region of the small, in time and space,
the physical laws are probably invalid; the stone falls to earth
and we know exactly the law by which it moves. Whether
this law holds, however, for each arbitrarily small fraction of
the motion [...] that is more than doubtful.” [6]. One of the
intellectual heirs of Boltzmann and Exner in Vienna was the
Nobel laureate and founding father of quantum theory, Erwin
Schro¨dinger. Indeed, he fully embraced their skeptical po-
sitions about determinism: “As pupil of the venerable Franz
1 By indeterminism we denote the sufficient condition that there exists at
least one phenomenon, or a type of phenomena, which do not obey deter-
minism.
2 Probabilities are said to be irreducible if “it is not possible by further inves-
tigation to discover further facts that will provide a better estimate of the
probability.” [4].
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2Exner I have been on intimate terms for a long time with
the idea that probably not microscopic lawfulness but perhaps
‘absolute accident’ forms the foundation of our statistics.” [7].
Interestingly, contrarily to the text-books presentation of
classical physics, the fact that classical systems have a per-
fectly predeterminate dynamics (thus giving rise to perfectly
deterministic predictions) is not inherent in the formalism (see
Section II). Rather, it is based on an additional hidden assump-
tion that takes the form of a principle. In a previous work [8],
we have named this principle of infinite precision. This is ar-
ticulated in two parts, as follows:
Principle of infinite precision
1. Ontological – there exists an actual value of every phys-
ical quantity, with its infinite determined digits (in any
arbitrary numerical base).
2. Epistemological – despite it might not be possible to
know all the digits of a physical quantity (through mea-
surements), it is possible to know an arbitrarily large
number of digits.
It is only when its formalism is complemented with this
principle that classical physics becomes deterministic.
However, the principle of infinite precision is inconsistent
with any operational meaning, as already made evident by
Max Born. The latter gave pivotal contributions to the foun-
dations of quantum formalism –introducing the fundamental
rule that bears his name, which allows to assign probabili-
ties to quantum measurements, and for which he was awarded
the Nobel Prize– and became critical of classical determinism
due to its “infinite precision”. Indeed, in his essay Is Classical
Mechanics in fact Deterministic? [9], he affirmed:
It is usually asserted in this theory [classical
physics] that the result is in principle determinate
and that the introduction of statistical considera-
tions is necessitated only by our ignorance of the
exact initial state of a large number of molecules.
I have long thought the first part of this assertion
to be extremely suspect. [...] Statements like ’a
quantity x has a completely definite value’ (ex-
pressed by a real number and represented by a
point in the mathematical continuum) seem to me
to have no physical meaning. [Because they] can-
not in principle be observed.
To explain how infinite precision and determinism relate to
one another it is interesting to rephrase a simple example de-
vised by Born. Referring to figure 1, consider a (classical) par-
ticle that is bound to move in a one-dimensional cavity with
perfectly elastic walls and total length l. If the particle has a
perfectly determinate (i.e. with infinite precision) initial posi-
tion x(t = 0) = x0 and velocity~v(t = 0) =~v0, classical physics
then allows to predict, also with infinite precision, the future
positions x(t) and velocities ~v(t) for any time instant t. Yet,
FIG. 1. Toy example of a system (a classical particle confined in a
cavity), in which the indeterminacy on the initial conditions is am-
plified in the future indeterminacy of the physical state while time
passes.
imagine to slightly relax the principle of infinite precision and,
while x0 remains fully determinate, the initial velocity (say
pointing to the right) of the particle has a small indeterminacy,
i.e. v0 ≤ v(t = 0) = v0+∆v0. Once the particle starts moving,
its initial indeterminacy starts to be reflected on the determi-
nation of its position at later times. According to the laws of
classical mechanics, the range of possible future positions of
the particle increases linearly as time passes, i.e. ∆x(t)= t∆v0.
This means that, for any arbitrarily small indeterminacy of the
initial velocity ∆v0, there always exists a critical time instant
tc := l/∆v0, such that ∆x(t = tc) = l. Namely, independently
of how small is the initial indeterminacy, it is sufficient to wait
enough long time for having complete indeterminacy on the
particle’s position within the cavity. This clearly shows that
the principle of infinite precision is a necessary condition for
determinism.
This example is one of the simplest instantiations of those
systems whose future dynamics is highly susceptible to a vari-
ation of the initial conditions (a property called instability).
Such a phenomenon is typical of the so-called chaotic systems
wherein the uncertainty in the determination of future val-
ues of some physical quantities increases exponentially with
elapsed time. As a matter of fact, criticisms of classical de-
terminism became more severe in the second half of the last
century, when the chaos theory was further developed and its
fundamental consequences understood [10, 11].
Furthermore, the challenges to determinism in classical
physics experienced a revival in very recent years, when sev-
eral scholars formalized the fact that predetermined physical
quantities seems to be at odds with information-theoretic ar-
guments [8, 12–16], as we will show in detail in what follows.
II. THE “ORTHODOX INTERPRETATION” OF
CLASSICAL PHYSICS
In order to introduce the arguments against the tenability
of determinism in classical physics and a possible alternative
interpretation thereof,3 we first ought to recall some pillars
of the formalism of that theory. We refer here to the standard
formalism together with its metaphysical assumptions (i.e. the
principle of infinite precision) as the “orthodox interpretation”
3 We use here the expression “interpretation” and not “theory” because we
consider only empirically indistinguishable predictions (in the same sense
of the interpretations of quantum mechanics) [18].
3FIG. 2. Suggestive representations of physical states in phase space, in comparison for “orthodox” classical physics (left), quantum physics
(middle), and “alternative” classical physics (right). In the orthodox classical physics, the state is a mathematical point which determines a
unique trajectory (determinism), whereas both in quantum and alternative classical physics the state has a fundamental indeterminacy that
leads to an indeterministic dynamics. The peculiarity of quantum physics is that its formalism sets a precise value to the smallest size of a cell
in phase space.
of classical physics.4
Conceptually, classical physics (say Newtonian mechanics,
but equivalent arguments apply to classical electromagnetism,
too) is characterized by (i) the physical state of a system,
which accounts for its relevant physical properties and (ii) a
set of general laws that govern the evolution (backwards and
forward in time) of the physical state.5 Formally speaking,
the dynamical properties of a system are identified by a set
of physical quantities, which mathematically are called vari-
ables. The collection of these variables (typically position and
momentum) is called the state of the system and the space
composed of all the possible values taken by these quanti-
ties is called phase space. Moreover, the assumption of the
principle of infinite precision results in the fact that classical
states are mathematical points in a continuous phase space.
Namely, a physical state is an n-tuple of real numbers for a
n-dimensional phase space.
As for the mathematical characterization of the general
laws of classical mechanics, these are ordinary differential
equations that take as inputs the values from the state at time
t0, called initial conditions, and return the state of the system
at any arbitrary time t. The mathematical theory of differ-
ential equation then guarantees that, given any sequence of
subsequent states in a certain interval of time, i.e. a trajectory
in phase space for that interval, there exists always a unique
extension thereof, into the past and the future [17]. This math-
ematical formalization all together leads, in fact, to the formal
4 We borrow this name from the foundations of quantum mechanics, where
the attribution “orthodox” is usually associated to the most widespread in-
terpretation of the quantum formalism, also called the “Copenhagen inter-
pretation”, attributed to Niels Bohr and his school.
5 To these two main aspects of classical physics one has to add a third one,
(iii) that there exists a background time which allows to speak about the
state of a physical system at a certain instant of time and its evolution at
later instants.
definition of Laplacian determinism: For any given physical
state there exists a unique evolution, i.e., a unique trajectory
in phase space. However, as stressed by Drossel, “the idea
of a deterministic time evolution represented by a trajectory
in phase space can only be upheld within the framework of
classical mechanics if a point in phase space has infinite pre-
cision” [16].
We have already pointed out how the concept of infinite
precision has no operational meaning. This was also recently
remarked by Rovelli, who stated that “concretely we never
determine a point in phase space with infinite precision –this
would be meaningless–, we rather say that the system ‘is in
a finite region R of phase space’, implying that determining
the value of the variables will yield values in R.” [19]. Note
that while in “orthodox” classical mechanics R degenerates to
a mathematical point, in quantum physics there is a funda-
mental lower limit to the size of the region in phase space. In
particular, the volume of the region, Vol(R), cannot be smaller
than the size delimited by the Planck constant (for each degree
of freedom), i.e.,
Vol(R)≥ (2pi~)(d.o. f .).
Rovelli refers to this as “the major physical characterization
of quantum theory” [19].
But are quantum and classical physics necessarily so differ-
ent on this matters? One has to realize that the principle of
infinite precision is not part of the mathematical formalism of
classical theory, but rather it belongs to the domain of inter-
pretations. In fact, one can consider –and several arguments
point in the direction that one should perhaps do so– an al-
ternative interpretation of classical physics in which physical
states are not mathematical point characterized by (n-tuples
of) real numbers. In this way, even classical physics would
display a fundamental indeterminacy, and its conceptual dif-
ference with quantum mechanics should be scaled down (see
Fig. 2).
4Bringing into play again Born’s operationalism, one ought
to consider the following [9]:
A statement like x = pi cm would have a phys-
ical meaning only if one could distinguish be-
tween it and x = pin cm for every n, where pin is
the approximation of pi by the first n decimals.
This, however, is impossible; and even if we sup-
pose that the accuracy of measurement will be in-
creased in the future, n can always be chosen so
large that no experimental distinction is possible.
Of course, I do not intend to banish from physics
the idea of a real number. It is indispensable for
the application of analysis. What I mean is that
a physical situation must be described by means
of real numbers in such a way that the natural un-
certainty in all observations is taken into account.
As we will show in the next section, one can indeed envision
an alternative classical physics that maintains the same gen-
eral laws (equations of motion) of the standard formalism, but
dismisses the physical relevance of real numbers, thereby as-
signing a fundamental indeterminacy to the values of physical
quantities, as wished by Born. In fact, “as soon as one real-
izes that the mathematical real numbers are not really real, i.e.
have no physical significance, then one concludes that classi-
cal physics is not deterministic.” [13].
III. AN ALTERNATIVE, INDETERMINISTIC
INTERPRETATION OF CLASSICAL PHYSICS
A. Determinism at odds with information principles
The relaxation of the principle of infinite precision does not
come about only as a mere intellectual exercise, or as a proof
of principle that classical physics is compatible with alterna-
tive interpretations beyond the orthodox one. In fact, the moti-
vation for searching novel interpretations of classical physics
stems also from the application of information-theoretic con-
cepts to physics. Indeed, our current understanding tells us
that
information is not a disembodied abstract entity;
it is always tied to a physical representation. It is
represented by engraving on a stone tablet, a spin,
a charge, a hole in a punched card, a mark on pa-
per, or some other equivalent. This ties the han-
dling of information to all the possibilities and
restrictions of our real physical world, its laws of
physics and its storehouse of available parts. [20].
This view goes under the name of Landauer’s principle, in
short, “information is physical”.
In Ref. [13], Gisin gave sound arguments to support the
claim that “a finite volume of space cannot contain more than
a finite amount of information”. Intuitively, this is a direct
consequence of Landauer’s principle, because each bit of in-
formation to be stored requires a certain amount of space,
bounded from below by the size of the smallest physical sys-
tem that can encode it. Although today, thanks to the incredi-
ble development of the technology of miniaturization, we are
able to encode and manipulate information in astonishingly
small systems. This allows to reach densities of information
storage of about 25 terabytes per centimeter square [21] on
atomic lattices, whereas molecular storage of information in
DNA has recently achieved extraordinary densities of infor-
mation of the order of a million terabyte per cubic millime-
ter [22]. These outstanding results notwithstanding, physical
systems have a finite size, hence it seems a very reasonable
assumption to believe that there is a finite limit to the possible
information density.
Furthermore, a well known formal theoretical argument sets
a limit to the allowed information density, called Bekenstein
bound [23], states that the information I (in number of bits)
contained in a system circumscribed by a sphere of radius R is
smaller than the mass-energy E enclosed in the same sphere,
i.e.,
I
2piR
≤ E
ln2
,
where we have adopted the Planck units (i.e., c = ~= 1). The
intuition behind this is that the storage of each bit of infor-
mation is associated with a certain amount of energy and that
unbound densities of energy degenerate into black holes.
Coming back to the orthodox interpretation of classical
physics, we have already shown how this assumes that phys-
ical states are mathematical points in phase space, expressed
by (n-tuples of) real numbers. However, it should be noticed
that real numbers contain, in general, an infinite amount of
information. As we have learnt since primary school, the set
of real numbers encompasses all the familiar rational num-
bers and supplement them with the irrational numbers. How-
ever, even among the irrational numbers, there are fundamen-
tal conceptual differences that have relevant consequences for
the role they are attributed in physics. All the irrational num-
bers we are used to speak about, such as
√
2 or pi, are, in fact,
computable irrational numbers. This means that they can be
compressed into an algorithm of finite length which, at every
iteration, outputs the next digit of the considered number. So,
although an irrational computable number has infinite digits
without a periodic pattern, and, as such, it would take infi-
nite time (i.e., iterations of the associated algorithm) to get all
the digits, its actual information content is finite. Everything
there is to know about it is contained in the algorithm that gen-
erates it. More precisely, the (finite) information content of a
computable number corresponds to the amount of information
in bits of shortest algorithm that outputs that number (i.e., its
Kolmogorov complexity). What is however disconcerting, is
that the amount of computable numbers among all the real
numbers is infinitely small (i.e., it forms a subset of Lebesgue
measure zero). Technically, the probability of picking a com-
putable number from the set of real numbers is zero (see also
[12, 13]).
Putting together the above arguments, we come to the con-
clusion that real numbers cannot be physically meaningful in-
sofar as their information content is almost always infinite.
5One thus ought to consider alternative interpretations of clas-
sical physics that do not enforce the principle of infinite preci-
sion. Namely, interpretations that do not assume that physical
quantities take values in the real numbers. Note again that
without real numbers, one cannot any longer uphold deter-
minism in classical physics.
In this view, the orthodox interpretation of classical physics
can be regarded as a deterministic completion of an indeter-
ministic model, in terms of hidden variables: Namely, the
real numbers [13, 14]. This is reminiscent of Bohm’s [24]
or Gudder’s [25] hidden variable models of quantum physics,
which provide a deterministic description of quantum me-
chanics by adding (in principle inaccessible) supplementary
variables, whereas the orthodox interpretation takes probabil-
ities (therefore indeterminism) to be irreducible.
B. “Finite information quantities” (FIQs).
To overcome the problem of the infinite information content
of real numbers in the context of physics, an explicit alterna-
tive model has been sketched in Ref. [13] and developed in
greater detail in Ref. [8]. This model entails an alternative in-
deterministic interpretation of classical mechanics. We review
here its main features.
In the spirit of the previous considerations, let us leave the
dynamical equations of Newtonian mechanics unchanged, but
let us relax the principle of infinite precision by substitut-
ing the real numbers with newly defined quantities. We re-
fer to them as “finite-information quantities” (FIQs), which,
while providing the same empirical predictions as the ortho-
dox interpretation of classical physics, have no overlap with
real numbers (they are not a mathematical number field, nor a
proper subset thereof).
Let us start by considering again the orthodox interpreta-
tion. Let a physical quantity γ ∈ R (say the position of a par-
ticle moving in one dimension) lie, without loss of generality,
in the interval [0,1] and write it in binary base:
γ= 0.γ1γ2 · · ·γ j · · · ,
where γ j ∈ {0,1}, ∀ j ∈ N+. This means that, being γ ∈ R, its
infinite bits are all given at once, i.e., always determined.
Consider now the following alternative model to describe
physical quantities which introduces an element of random-
ness in such a way to always guarantee the finiteness of the
information content. We thus introduce the following:
Definition - propensities
There exist objective properties, named propensities, q j ∈
[0,1]∩Q, for each digit j of a physical quantity. A propensity
quantifies the tendency of the jth binary digit to take the value
1.
The concept of propensities, borrowed from Popper’s ob-
jective interpretation of probabilities [26], can be understood
from the limit cases, namely when they are either 0 or 1. For
example, q j = 1 means that the jth digit will take value 1
with certainty. On the opposite end, if a bit has an associated
propensity of 1/2, it means that the bit is totally indeterminate.
We posited that propensities are rational numbers to ensure
that their information content is always finite. In order to de-
fine physical quantities, we thus have to define the following:
Definition - FIQs
A finite-information quantity (FIQ) is an ordered list of
propensities {q1,q2, · · · ,q j, · · ·}, such that its information
content is finite, i.e., ∑ j I j < ∞, where I j = 1−H(q j) is the
information content of the propensity, and H is the binary en-
tropy function of its argument.
Note that a straightforward way to fulfill the condition of
finite information content is that, after a certain threshold, all
the bits become completely random, i.e., ∃M(t) ∈N such that
q j = 1/2,∀ j > M(t).
Since we require our alternative interpretation to be empir-
ically equivalent to the orthodox one, at least the digits of a
physical variable that are already known (i.e., measured) at
time t should be fully determined. Therefore, the propensi-
ties of the first, more significant, N(t) digits should be already
actualize, i.e. qi ∈ {0,1},∀i≤ N(t). We are now ready to ex-
press a physical quantities γ in this FIQ-based interpretation:
γ(N(t),M(t)) = 0. γ1γ2 · · ·γN(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
determined γ j∈{0,1}
?k , with qk∈(0,1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
?N(t)+1 · · ·?M(t) ?M(t)+1 · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
?l , with ql= 12
,
where the symbols ?i means that the digit in position i is not
yet determined. Notice that in this framework the potential
property of becoming actual (a list of propensities, FIQ), has
somehow a more fundamental status than an already actual-
ized value (a list of determined bits). In fact, in this alterna-
tive interpretation, a state would be the collection of all the
FIQs associated with the dynamical variables (i.e., the list of
the propensities of each digit). Thus, even two systems that
are to be considered identical at a certain instant of time (in
the sense that they are in the same state) will have, in general,
different actual values at later times. But then, how does the
actualization happen in such a way that is compatible with the
observed results? To answer this question we need to discuss
what is a measurement in a non-deterministic physics.
C. The classical “measurement problem”
Any indeterministic interpretation of a physical theory
needs to face the questions (measurement problem): How does
a single value of a physical variable become actualized out of
its possible values? Or how does potentiality become actual-
ity? Our experience, in fact, tell us that every time a quantity
gets measured there is only one value registered by the instru-
ment. In order to address this issue, however, it is necessary to
first ask: What is a measurement? This long-lasting question
is one of the most profound open problems of the foundations
6of quantum physics (see, e.g. [27]). As we have recalled,
the latter is normally considered the first theory to have intro-
duced fundamental indeterminacy in the domain of physics.
Yet, if an indeterministic interpretation of classical physics is
upheld, also this is subject to a measurement problem.
Let us operationally define what are the minimal require-
ment for a process to be considered a measurement:
Definition - Minimal requirements for a measurement
1. Stability: Consecutive measurements of the same quan-
tity leave the already determined digits unchanged.
2. Intersubjectivity: Different agents can access the same
measurement outcomes.
3. Precision improvability: With more accurate measure-
ment apparatuses, more digits become available (with
the former two properties).
In order to be an empirically adequate model, in the FIQ-
based indeterministic interpretation of classical physics, too,
one needs to explain how to comply with these properties of
measurements. By construction of FIQs, propensities are ob-
jective properties subjected to fundamental irreversibility (i.e.,
once they become either 0 or 1 the remain unchanged), and
this accounts for the stability and ensures the intersubjective
availability of the measurement results.
What is far from being straightforward, however, is the
compliance with precision improvability. In Ref. [8], we have
introduced two possible ways to account for this property. On
the one hand, one can envisage (i) a mechanism that makes
the actualization to spontaneously occur as time passes. This
resembles the so-called objective collapse models of quantum
mechanics [28–30]. On the other hand, it is possible to think
that (ii) the actualization happens when a higher level requires
it, thus, with some top-down causation mechanism [31]. In
this case, it would be the measurement apparatus that “im-
poses” to the physical variables to acquire a determined value.
This is clearly reminiscent of the Copenhagen interpretation
of quantum mechanics.
Such a “classical measurement problem” remains an open
problem as much as its more notorious quantum counterpart.
Yet, it should be noticed that however problematic, the fact
that both classical and quantum physics share this issue helps
to scale down the fundamental difference between these two
theories.
IV. (IN)DETERMINISM AND CAUSALITY
Like in the orthodox interpretation, in the indeterministic
model previously introduced, too, the laws of classical me-
chanics are taken to be general relations that causally connect
physical states at different instants of time. Traditionally, in
the philosophy of science, the concepts of determinism and
causality have been long wedded, to the extent that usually
Laplacian determinism is often referred to as causal deter-
minism. One of the most notable examples of this can be
found in Hume, who maintained that a cause is always suf-
ficient for its effect: “It is not possible on Hume’s account, for
causes to be less than deterministic.” [4]. Also Leibniz ele-
vated determinism to an a priori truth, when formulating his
principle of sufficient reason: “There is nothing without a rea-
son, or no effect without a cause” (quoted in [17]). And Kant
even formulated what is sometimes called the law of univer-
sal causation, according to which, “if we [...] experience that
something happens, then we always presuppose thereby that
something precedes on which it follows in accordance with a
rule.” [32].6
The concept of causation is also traditionally related, at
least in science, to the quest for explanation. This means to
ask: Why did the (observed) event Ei happen? (here i labels
the time at which E occurs). Answering this question in a
deterministic worldview seems to us quite meaningless. In
fact, were everything completely predetermined, this question
–like any other one– would not be a genuine question, in the
sense that, for whoever asked it, this was a necessity from the
beginning of times. Everything would just be an already shot
film that is unrolling, and the script of the film makes you say
the line “why did Ei happen?”.
Moreover, even if we assume that an agent, or an intellect,
is external to everything that occurs in the universe (i.e. s/he
is really watching the movie from outside), thereby not be-
ing included in this predetermined state of the universe, this is
not unproblematic. Asking why something happened is in this
case certainly meaningful but the answer is trivial: Because
this is the film I am watching (and there are no other films
available!). Again, determinism assumes that given an initial
state of the universe and universal laws everything causally
follows. But this is misleading because there is only one spe-
cific initial state and, without alternatives, causation seems a
void concept.
On the contrary, indeterminism introduced the possibility
of alternatives, thereby making causality meaningful. If one
asks the reason why a certain event E j occurred, is now pos-
sible to reply: “Because another event Ei/A happened before
(i.e., i < j) and not its mutually exclusive alternative Ei/B”.
Significant progress in weakening the bond between deter-
minism and causality was made in the second half of the nine-
teenth century, thanks to the work of philosophers the likes of
K.R. Popper [26], J. Earman [17], W. Salmon [33], P. Dowe
[4], H. Reichenbach [34], I. J. Good [35] and P. Suppes [36].
Mostly inspired by quantum mechanics, the concept of prob-
abilistic causality came about. This maintains that an event C
directly influences another event E but is not sufficient for it.
A common, and quite grim, example to explain probabilistic
causality features the following chain of events (temporally
ordered): A scientist, Eric, sits in a sealed room (i.e., without
6 Note that Kant refers to rule as a univocal correspondence and does not
contemplate any non-deterministic (e.g., probabilistic) law that relates
causes and effects.
7any exchange with the external environment). His colleague,
Clara, brings a canister full of radioactive material in Eric’s
room (ideally, making sure that there are no other exchanges
with the environment). While time elapses, the radioactive
material will be decaying –at a certain probabilistic rate de-
pending on its chemical composition– releasing ionizing ra-
diation. Sadly, at some point, Eric develops radiation poison-
ing. Now, since decay is governed by quantum mechanics and
in that theory probabilities are considered irreducible, there
was no deterministic process relating Clara’s actions to Eric’s
condition. However, if you think that Clara can be held ac-
countable for Eric’s sickness, then you believe in probabilistic
causality.
FIG. 3. Causal graphs of a deterministic (left) and indeterministic
(right) series of events. The red arrows relate events that actually
happen, while the blue ones denote potential, mutually exclusive, al-
ternative events of which only one will happen with a certain propen-
sity qK (see main text).
Referring to Fig. 3, we can graphically formalize deter-
ministic (on the left) and probabilistic causality (on the right).
Both are represented as graphs which are directed (causes pre-
cede their effects in time), and acyclic (an effect cannot be the
cause if itself). However, in a deterministic graph, there are
no possible alternatives: Everything that could happen will
happen.7 On the contrary, a graph representing probabilis-
tic causality (Fig. 3-right) is a multigraph with two types of
edges. The first ones (blue) represent the “potential causa-
tions” and are weighted with the measure or the degree to
7 Note that it is of course not necessary that each event is effect and cause
of one and only one event as in Fig. 3-left. We represented this simple
chain because we deem less confusing the comparison with the probabilis-
tic graph (Fig. 3-right).
which an event Ei causes future events E j/K , where i, j la-
bel the time instants and K ∈ {A,B, ...} the possible mutually
exclusive alternatives.8 A natural choice for the weights of
the potential causation is clearly propensities qK , as defined in
Sect. III B. The second kind of edges (red), instead, represent
what actually happened and can be reconstructed in hindsight
after the actualization of the potentiality has happened (e.g.,
after measurements).
Clearly, the alternative interpretation of classical physics
based on FIQs, introduced in section III B), is causal but not
deterministic and can be represented by causal graphs of the
second type (Fig. 3-right).
Recently, D’Ariano, Manessi and Perinotti [37] have
pointed out that the notions of determinism and causality are
logically independent, namely one can have not only non-
deterministic (probabilistic) causal theories, such as quantum
mechanics, but in principle non-causal deterministic theories,
too. Their argument is carried out in the framework of opera-
tional probabilistic theories, introduced by some of the same
authors in previous works. Without entering the formal de-
tails, according to the authors of Ref. [37] a theory id said to
be causal if there is no-signaling from the future. Namely, if
the probability of preparing a system in a certain initial state
is independent from the choice of measurements that will be
performed on the system itself. Determinism is instead de-
fined as “the property of a theory of having all probabilities of
physical events equal to either zero or one.” [37]. They then
cleverly design a toy-theory that is, in fact, deterministic but
not causal, according to their definitions.
However, defining deterministic behaviors as a limiting
case of probabilistic ones, while is seemingly very natural,
leads to subtle issues. Indeed, this boils down to give an inter-
pretation of what probabilities are supposed to mean. If they
are taken to have no causal meaning, but being merely mea-
sured frequencies of occurrences, then the fact that determin-
ism and causality are logically independent becomes trivial.
Consider a typical example of classical correlations: During a
vacation in New York, take a pair of shoes and separate them
into two identical boxes. Shuffle the boxes in a way that is
impossible to know which one contains the left, respectively
the right, shoe. Keep one box with you and send the other to
a friend in Tokyo. You can now open the box and you fig-
ure out that that you kept, say, the left shoe. Then you can
infer the following statement with probability one, i.e., deter-
ministically: “My friend in Tokyo has received a right shoe”.
Nobody, however, would ever entail that finding the left shoe
in New York has caused the right show to be found in Tokyo.9
8 Note that the celebrated Many-World Interpretation of quantum mechanics
affirms that all the possible alternative outcomes actually happen, hence
refuting the mutual exclusiveness thereof. While this is also a possible
further interpretation of the FIQ-based physics, we will not consider this
further.
9 One can object that in fact, the events were causally determined by the op-
eration of shuffling and it is only subjective ignorance that makes this ap-
pear random. Fair enough, but then substitute the shoes with two quantum
entangled particles and you will convince yourself that you have “deter-
minism” (in the sense of perfect correlations) without causality (see [38]).
8Similarly, take the digits of a (computable) number, say pi.
If you know with certainty that the number you are dealing
with is really pi, for instance because is the ratio between a
circle’s circumference and its diameter, then you can assert
with probability one, i.e. deterministically, that its nineteenth
decimal digit is a 4. Again, nobody would claim that you
caused this digit to be 4 by measuring the circumference and
diameter of a circle.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this essay, we have revised arguments to support the view
that classical physics could be interpreted indeterministically,
and basic operational principles and information-theoretic ar-
guments hint at this direction. At the same time, quantum
mechanics has given us reason (in particular by means of the
violation of Bell’s inequalities [38]) to believe that the uni-
verse we live in is not deterministic. If this is the case, Pop-
per’s words remind us of what is the reward for indetermin-
ism: “The future is open. It is not predetermined and thus
cannot be predicted –except by accident. The possibilities that
lie in the future are infinite” [40]. In fact, not only is the future
unpredictable in an indeterministic universe, but also the truth
values of future (scientific) statements are genuinely undecid-
able, as Gisin’s simple example points out [39]:
Think of a proposition about the future, for ex-
ample, “It will be raining in exactly one year time
from now at Piccadilly Circus”. If one believes in
determinism, then this proposition is either true
or false [...]. But if one believes that the future
is open, then it is not predetermined that it will
rain, hence the proposition is not true, and it is
not predetermined that it will not rain, thus the
proposition is also not false.
However, our stance on an open future cannot remain but a
belief, because compelling arguments (e.g., [41, 42]) show
that every physical theory, including classical and quantum
mechanics, can be interpreted either deterministically or inde-
terministically and no experiment will ultimately discriminate
between these two opposite worldviews. We can only have
the certainty that the future of the battle between determinism
and indeterminism is open, too.
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